Some problems of complex control in the fields connected with public life (i.e., socialeconomic, political and other fields) include semistructured control object. Situation appears semistructured if the basic parameters have qualitative (not quantitative) nature, and their values are subjective expert evaluations. Cognitive maps serve to solve control problems for semistructured situations. Cognitive map is a model representing knowledge of the expert (or a group of experts) regarding situation; this model is described in the form of weighted directed graph. The nodes of cognitive map correspond to those concepts being employed to describe the situation. The concept may be treated as a variable (for instance, “national defence capacity”) which may have different values, such as “high,” “low” and so on. Weighted arc is interpreted as direct cause-effect relationship between two concepts. Suppose several decision-makers (agents) take part in the process of decision making in an semistructured situation given t at the utility of each of them depends both on his self actions and the actions of the others, than interactions of the agents can be seen as a game on the cognitive map. In the game cognitive map represents a model of semistructured control object and clearly describe the dynamics of the situation. The use of cognitive maps in the game gives more detailed and visual modeling of the conflict environment in the form of simple causal links, so as to describe the goals and strategies of the agents in terms of the environment which makes it more convenient to model the real conflicts adequately. Since the input data for the model are expert evaluation prone to subjectiveness, it is necessary to estimate the tolerance of model results to errors in input data. Experts evaluate the “importance percentage” of a target concept compared the others target concepts and the weight of edges in cognitive map. The sign of edge weight indicates the type of the causal link and the value of edge weight indicates the strength of he causal link. In this paper we consider the problem of model tolerance to errors in input data and illustrate it on the material of conflict of interests between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea.

Operation and emergency control including dispatching and automatic control procedures and devices that provide reliability and survivability of electric power system plays an important role in the control of operating conditions in the Unified Energy System (UES) of Russia. This control system is rather developed and even now has elements of the Smart Grid ideology due to its current adaptability, optimality and intelligence. The authors present current operation and emergency control system in the UES of Russia and suggest a modern approach to monitoring, forecasting and control. Some advanced methods and tools for development of dispatching and automatic control in electric power system are discussed. This work was supported by the grant of Leading Scientific School of the Russian Federation #1507.2012.8.

The goal of this paper is to use geometrical theory of nonlinear partial differential equations and singularities theory to obtain the general scheme for constructing an optimal control for fronts of petroleum displacement by active reagent. We illustrate our geometric approach to evolutionary models of petroleum deposits. Original simulation methods for the frontal displacement of oil by water and solutions of active reagents in porous medium of oilfield reservoirs with and without capillary forces has been developed. For simplicity and clarity of presentation the only one-dimensional models of fluid filtration between parallel batteries of production and injection wells (Buckley-Leverett and Rapoport-Liss models) has been considered. The model for oil displacement by solutions of active reagents in hot water has been also analyzed. The proposed results are generalized for two- and three-dimensional filtration models in reservoir engineering using vertical and horizontal wells, which greatly facilitates the statement and development of simulation and optimal control methods for reservoir engineering in general.

We consider a model of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints originated in papers of Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1925). It is well known that this model may not posses a Nash equilibrium. Our aim is to solve original problem in terms of the equilibrium in secure strategies. It coincides with the Nash Equilibrium when Nash Equilibrium exists and takes into account the intention of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against the actions of other players. This approach reflects the natural logic of behavior of players in this model. We will show that in some cases when Nash equilibrium does not exist there is an Equilibrium in secure strategies. However for some (big enough) capacities equilibrium in secure strategies does not exist either. A criterion for the equilibrium existence is formulated and proved.

In this research it was considered the particular case of a railway problem, specifically, the construction of orders delivery schedule for one locomotive plying among three railway station. In this paper it was suggested a polynomial algorithm and were shown the results of a computing experiment.