Уважаемые коллеги,

12 октября в 14:30 состоится онлайн заседание Общемосковского семинара Экспертные оценки и анализ данных.



Directed search in finite markets: models, applications and extensions

Marina Sandomirskaia, Ruslan Shavshin (HSE University)

 

Аннотация

Finite markets are two-sided markets where the number of homogeneous products is limited and sellers are disable to serve all buyers individually. This leads to the situation of friction which means that the seller with lowest price will not be necessarily chosen with probability one. Previous studies show that in symmetric markets the unique equilibrium price greater than marginal costs will be formed. Firstly, we extend the standard model to the market with more than one product at every seller. We show that for a seller her equilibrium total utility is a bell-shaped function of the number of products per seller, thus, there exists an optimal for sellers number of products on the market which substitutes some deficit. Then we extend the results on the markets with non-equal amount of products across sellers, obtain resulting price dispersion and clarify the relation between big and small firms. Secondly, we incorporate private valuations into standard finite market model on buyers’ side. We assume that buyers are drawn from the same distribution. We prove that the buyers’ optimal strategy now is monotonic and prescribes to choose the particular seller in dependence of her valuation (the greater is valuation, the greater price must be chosen). We obtain the conditions on the thresholds in the support of CDF of valuations. Then we get that, in equilibrium, prices must be dispersed, and at least in epsilon-equilibrium, sellers split the market and choose which category of potential buyers they are ready to serve. The given topic is highly related to the online-platform framework, both retail market and labor market and crowdsoursing.

 

Адрес для подключения к видеоконференции zoom:

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/86415311523?pwd=allibDJKZVp6SjBnNjBuVXZMcEFGdz09

Meeting ID: 864 1531 1523

Passcode: 447616