Motivated by research works on Zeuthen-Hicks bargaining, which leads to the Nash bargaining solution, we analyze experimental data of resource allocation gaming with Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The games were designed in the form of negotiation to allow players to reach consensus. Behavior models based on best response, constant behavior, and Nash bar- gaining solution are defined. Analysis conducted over decisions made by participants shows that a significant share of all decisions leads to an increase of Nash bargaining value. It is even higher than the share of decisions that are in agreement with the best-response concept. Consensus-ended games show light attraction to Nash bargaining solution behavior, it’s less than we obtained in games with mechanism of Yang-Hajek from another class of so-called proportional allocation mechanisms. We discuss differences of consensus-ended games from timeout-ended games, what decisions lead to the situations with Nash bargaining value increasing and differences between balanced mechanism Groves-Ledyard and unbalanced mechanism Yang-Hajek.