The problem of forming a mechanism for increasing productivity in a corporation under conditions of uncertainty is considered. The corporation is considered as a two-tier organizational system, at the upper level of which there is a management (center), and at the lower level there are manufacturing factories. The center does not have complete information about the productivity of subordinate factories. Therefore, the center is forced to use estimates of productivity obtained from a model of recurrent evaluation of the system’s productivity. But manpower of factories, as visionary active elements can choose their indicators in such a way as to influence these estimates to increase inducements. The specified mechanism includes the procedure for rationing productivity, as well as the procedure for inducement manpower. The solution to the corresponding game of visionary active elements and the center is considered. The task of the optimal synthesis of an adaptive corporate mechanism that identifies the true productivity of factories is set. Sufficient conditions for its solution are found. Based on them, the rationing procedure is synthesized for a quadratic loss function. The developed approach is illustrated by the example of rationing the productivity of factories of the Russian Railways holding.