This paper consists of two parts. In the second part, the management mechanisms for implementing complex projects that improve the energy-saving characteristics of products and technologies are further studied. An incentive model for saving energy in the sequence of projects within a multi-project structure is considered, and an optimal mechanism for this model is proposed. This mechanism includes a planning procedure, penalty functions for the nonfulfillment of plans, and an incentive function for project results. The functioning of the system is treated as a game of the Principal and sequentially connected agents who implement projects. The Principal’s strategy is the choice of a specific mechanism. The agents’ strategies are messages, in which they report to the Principal some information about their parameters, and also the choice of the project results. The information about the agents’ parameters is necessary to calculate the plans based on the planning procedure. At the same time, the agents may prefer not to tell the truth, reporting unreliable (distorted) information. It is shown that the optimal mechanism proposed below stimulates the agents to provide reliable information and also to choose the project results coinciding with the plans. The first part of this paper (see [3]) was devoted to the mechanisms of project assessment and resource allocation; the results established therein are used to propose a project management system for implementing complex projects.