Автор(ы): Федянин Д. Н. (ИПУ РАН, Лаборатория 57)Автор(ов): 1 Параметры публикацииТип публикации: Глава в книгеНазвание: Reflexive and Epistemic Properties of the Tullock Rent-Seeking GameISBN/ISSN: 978-3-030-51940-7DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-51941-4_3Наименование источника: Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and ApplicationsГород: BostonИздательство: Birkhäuser, ChamГод издания: 2020Страницы: 25-36 АннотацияThis study sets out to investigate the impact of information control in the Tullock rent-seeking game. The game itself is constructed by using a normal form and making suggestions on the agents’ believes and knowledge. We found domains of parameters where monotonicity of the impact holds too. Together, these results provide valuable insights into the effects of reflexive analysis on the properties of information control. Библиографическая ссылка: Федянин Д.Н. Reflexive and Epistemic Properties of the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game / Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Boston: Birkhäuser, Cham, 2020. С. 25-36.