42646

Автор(ы): 

Автор(ов): 

1

Параметры публикации

Тип публикации: 

Доклад

Название: 

On a reflective network structure of agents’ beliefs

Наименование конференции: 

  • International Workshop «Networking games and management» (Петрозаводск, 2012)

Наименование источника: 

  • Proceeding of the International Workshop "Networking games and management" (NGM-2012, Petrozavodsk)

Город: 

  • Петрозаводск

Издательство: 

  • Карельский научный центр РАН

Год издания: 

2012

Страницы: 

15-18
Аннотация
This paper demonstrates an example of successful analysis of reflexive network’s influence on equilibria in certain network game, which all nonreflective equilibria are known and have been found in [2,3]. It has been proved several statements on the assumption that the set of admissible decision rules in this game has the following properties: the players who know each other’s attributes, play a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and the actions of players whose attributes are unknown to them, they predict, based on the criteria for acceptance Hurwitz solutions with the parameter equal to the optimism either zero or one. It was also constructed optimal control by reflexive network for some cases of different distributions of optimism among the players to prevent any non-zero equilibrium in the given network game.

Библиографическая ссылка: 

Федянин Д.Н. On a reflective network structure of agents’ beliefs / Proceeding of the International Workshop "Networking games and management" (NGM-2012, Petrozavodsk). Петрозаводск: Карельский научный центр РАН, 2012. С. 15-18.