Автор(ы): Искаков М. Б. (ИПУ РАН, Лаборатория 57)Искаков А. Б. (ИПУ РАН, Лаборатория 82)Автор(ов): 2 Параметры публикацииТип публикации: Книга (брошюра, монография, стандарт)Название: Asymmetric equilibria in secure strategies Город: MoscowИздательство: National Research University Higher School of EconomicsГод издания: 2015Объём, стр.: 48 АннотацияWe introduce a generalization of equilibrium in secure strategies, which takes into account inhomogeneous attitudes of players to security in noncooperative games. In the proposed Asymmetric Equilibrium in Secure Strategies players are divided into classes that unequally related to each other threats. Namely, a player in his behavior takes into account threats posed by players of his own or higher class, and ignores threats of lower-class players. We provide illustrative examples of these equilibria in matrix and continuous games, which have neither Nash-Cournot equilibrium no equilibrium in secure strategies. The proposed concept provides theoretical framework for studying games in which asymmetric and hierarchical logic plays an important role in the interaction of players. Библиографическая ссылка: Искаков М.Б., Искаков А.Б. Asymmetric equilibria in secure strategies. Moscow: National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2015. – 48 с.