A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented.
The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists
and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security
against actions of other players. The new concept is illustrated by a number of matrix game
examples and compared with other closely related theoretical models. We prove the existence of
equilibrium in secure strategies in four classic games that fail to have Nash-Cournot equilibria.
On an infinite line we obtain the solution in secure strategies of the classic Hotelling’s price game
(1929) with a restricted reservation price and linear transportation costs. New type of
monopolistic solution in secure strategies is discovered in the Tullock Contest (1967, 1980) of
two players. For the model of insurance market we prove that the contract pair found by
Rothschild, Stiglitz and Wilson (1976) is always an equilibrium in secure strategies. We
characterize all equilibria in secure prices in the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model with
capacity constraints.