Параметры публикации

Тип публикации: 

Статья в журнале/сборнике


Equilibrium in Secure Strategies

Наименование источника: 

  • ECORE Discussion Papers

Обозначение и номер тома: 



  • Brussels


  • ECORE, International Association for Research and Teaching

Год издания: 



2-35, http://www.ecore.be/DPs/dp_1359990444.pdf
A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented. The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against actions of other players. The new concept is illustrated by a number of matrix game examples and compared with other closely related theoretical models. We prove the existence of equilibrium in secure strategies in four classic games that fail to have Nash-Cournot equilibria. On an infinite line we obtain the solution in secure strategies of the classic Hotelling’s price game (1929) with a restricted reservation price and linear transportation costs. New type of monopolistic solution in secure strategies is discovered in the Tullock Contest (1967, 1980) of two players. For the model of insurance market we prove that the contract pair found by Rothschild, Stiglitz and Wilson (1976) is always an equilibrium in secure strategies. We characterize all equilibria in secure prices in the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model with capacity constraints.

Библиографическая ссылка: 

Искаков А.Б., Искаков М.Б. Equilibrium in Secure Strategies / ECORE Discussion Papers. Brussels: ECORE, International Association for Research and Teaching, 2013. 2013/12. С. 2-35, http://www.ecore.be/DPs/dp_1359990444.pdf.