42810

Автор(ы): 

Автор(ов): 

1

Параметры публикации

Тип публикации: 

Доклад

Название: 

Drivers' Games and Road Carrying Capacity

Наименование конференции: 

  • 11th IEEE International Conference on Application of Information and Communication Technologies (AICT2017, Moscow)

Наименование источника: 

  • Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Application of Information and Communication Technologies (AICT2017, Moscow)

Обозначение и номер тома: 

т.2

Город: 

  • Москва

Издательство: 

  • IEEE

Год издания: 

2017

Страницы: 

239-243
Аннотация
The system of incentives in a transport corporation is considered, the vehicles of which are moving along a road on which overtaking is impossible (for example, on rail or a single-lane highway). This system includes payment the driver of vehicle for transportation, as well as penalties for violation of traffic rules associated with collision and speeding. The optimal guarantee strategy of the driver is constructed, ensuring the growth of his payment for the transportation, with the exclusion of these penalties. Game of drivers on the ring road is considered. A solution is found for this game in the stationary mode of motion. It is shown that this solution is Nash equilibrium. Based on the found solution of the drivers' game, the dependence of the road capacity on the number of vehicles on it is determined. It is shown that the capacity of Russian railways can be increased by reducing the number of freight wagons on its network.

Библиографическая ссылка: 

Цыганов В.В. Drivers' Games and Road Carrying Capacity / Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Application of Information and Communication Technologies (AICT2017, Moscow). М.: IEEE, 2017. т.2. С. 239-243.