27426

Автор(ы): 

Автор(ов): 

3

Параметры публикации

Тип публикации: 

Статья в журнале/сборнике

Название: 

Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest

Наименование источника: 

  • CORE discussion paper

Обозначение и номер тома: 

2014/10

Город: 

  • Louvain-la-Neuve

Издательство: 

  • Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Universite catholique de Louvain

Год издания: 

2014

Страницы: 

1-26
Аннотация
It is well known that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist for a two-player rent-seeking contest when the contest success function parameter is greater than two. We analyze the contest using the concept of equilibrium in secure strategies, which is a generalization of the Nash equilibrium. It is defined by two conditions: (i) no player can make a profitable deviation that decreases the payoff of another player and (ii), for any profitable deviation there is a subsequent deviation by another player, that is profitable for the second deviator and worse than the status quo for the first deviator. We show that such equilibrium always exists in the Tullock contest. Moreover, when the success function parameter is greater than two, this equilibrium is unique up to a permutation of players, and has a lower rent dissipation than in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Библиографическая ссылка: 

Искаков М.Б., Искаков А.Б., Захаров А.В. Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest // CORE discussion paper. 2014. 2014/10. С. 1-26.